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Frontier Ready.

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In this issue

A model-version jump turned a failing exploit chain into a same-day account takeover at a frontier lab, and Cisco Talos documented the first Windows malware that lets a panel of commercial LLMs vote on its next move. Two actively exploited max-severity network vulnerabilities and two already-patched AI-agent hijack techniques round out the issue.

Claude Opus 5 turned a failing exploit into a same-day OpenAI account takeover

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** major **Confidence:** SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for Hacktron's account of the Opus 4.8/Opus 5 timeline and the 72-hour figure; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for OpenAI's confirmed patch-and-bounty response; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for the CVE-2026-32882 technical chain. **Vendor interest:** Hacktron is a commercial AI-assisted penetration-testing firm; publicizing a dramatic capability jump from a bug-bounty engagement is favorable exposure for its business model. **Source:** The Hacker News — Claude Opus 5 Helped Researchers Take Over OpenAI Staff Accounts via Chained Flaws

What changed. Hacktron disclosed on September 19, 2026 that Claude Opus 4.8 failed across multiple sessions to build a working exploit chaining a libheif memory-corruption bug in OpenAI's Discourse forum (CVE-2026-32882) with a weakness in OpenAI's SSO login flow — but Claude Opus 5, released July 24, 2026, produced a working exploit within hours of a fresh session, and the researchers reached OpenAI staff ChatGPT/Codex accounts and an internal GitHub repository in under 72 hours from initial bug discovery. OpenAI confirmed a fix roughly 14 hours after the report and paid a $6,500 bounty on September 1.

Why it reaches you. The exposure path is any SSO integration linking a lower-trust surface — a support forum, a community portal — to production developer identity (GitHub, internal repos, CI). A single image-processing library bug in that lower-trust surface became an enterprise-wide identity breach because the forum and the developer account shared a trust boundary. The more durable signal is that the same exploit chain went from "a strong model can't finish it" to "a fresh model instance finishes it in hours" purely from a vendor-scheduled model upgrade — a capability threshold that arrives on the model provider's release calendar, not the defender's.

What to do. Security engineering — escalate: map which internal systems are reachable via SSO from any customer- or community-facing surface, and require step-up re-authentication at that boundary instead of inheriting trust from the lower-tier session.

CSA coverage. New — no prior CSA coverage.

Cisco Talos finds the first Windows malware that lets AI models vote on its next move

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** major **Confidence:** SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for Talos's description of the voting mechanism and CAIRN's detection tiers; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for independent confirmation of in-the-wild prevalence. **Vendor interest:** Cisco Talos discovered and disclosed this malware family; Cisco sells endpoint and network security products, though CAIRN itself ships as a free open-source framework. **Source:** Help Net Security — Researchers uncover malware that uses AI to choose its next move

What changed. Cisco Talos disclosed CLOSEDQUORUM on September 22, 2026 — the first publicly documented Windows implant that delegates its next tactical action to a live query of four commercial LLMs (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, Gemini), executing whichever of "steal data," "inject code," or "establish persistence" wins the vote, rather than following fixed operator commands. Talos released CAIRN alongside it, an open-source framework that identifies this class of AI-integrated malware from file metadata alone, without executing the sample.

Why it reaches you. Endpoint detection tuned to fixed C2 behavior patterns will miss a malware family whose decision logic changes at runtime based on an external LLM API response — the artifact to hunt for is an unexpected process calling a commercial model API endpoint, not a static beacon signature.

What to do. SOC/detection engineering — validate: run CAIRN or an equivalent metadata scan against endpoint binaries for embedded prompts and LLM provider endpoints, and add egress monitoring for endpoint processes calling consumer LLM APIs outside sanctioned AI tooling.

CSA coverage. New — no prior CSA coverage.

Cisco patches a root-access, no-workaround ISE zero-day under active exploitation

Category: vuln_storm **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Cisco PSIRT's confirmation of active exploitation and the maximum CVSS score; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for CISA KEV catalog entry details. **Source:** BleepingComputer — Cisco warns of max severity ISE zero-day

exploited in attacks

What changed. Cisco disclosed CVE-2026-76460 on September 17, 2026, a maximum-severity authentication-bypass flaw in an Identity Services Engine (ISE and ISE-PIC) API that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker reach root-level privileges with no workaround available. Cisco PSIRT confirmed active exploitation, and CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 16 with a three-day federal patch deadline that has since passed.

Why it reaches you. ISE is the network-access-control and identity policy engine authenticating and segmenting everything else on the network — a root compromise here can rewrite authorization policy for every device ISE governs, including the identity signals feeding AI-agent access decisions elsewhere in the estate.

What to do. Network security — escalate: patch immediately, then review ISE access.log on every node for anomalous usernames and re-image any node showing signs of compromise before restoring from backup, per Cisco's guidance.

CSA coverage. New — no prior CSA coverage.

A CVSS 10.0 VeloCloud Orchestrator flaw is under active exploitation in certificate-based setups

Category: vuln_storm **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Arista's confirmation of active exploitation; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for the backdoor and persistence indicators. **Source:** NetManageIT — New CVSS 10.0 VeloCloud Orchestrator Flaw Actively Exploited in Certificate-Based Setups

What changed. Arista disclosed on September 22, 2026 that CVE-2026-93952, a CVSS 10.0 flaw affecting VeloCloud Orchestrator deployments that use certificate-based authentication between edge devices and the orchestrator, is under active exploitation. An attacker with access to the public portion of an edge authentication certificate can send unfiltered input to the web interface to bypass authorization; Arista said the issue "was discovered externally and is known to be actively exploited," with intrusions installing a backdoor script (vcnode.js) and persistence files under system directories.

Why it reaches you. VeloCloud Orchestrator centrally manages SD-WAN edge devices across a distributed enterprise network and is exposed to the internet by design for edge provisioning — a bypass here gives an attacker centralized control of WAN routing and traffic across every site the orchestrator manages.

What to do. Network security — escalate: confirm patch status for your release train (some trains remain unpatched per vendor guidance), rotate edge authentication certificates, and hunt for vcnode.js or unexpected persistence files on orchestrator hosts.

CSA coverage. New — no prior CSA coverage.

Two OpenAI Codex sandbox escapes reached the host machine before an eight-day fix

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for OpenAI's confirmation the issues were "addressed in August"; SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for the researcher's eight-day remediation timeline. **Source:** BleepingComputer — Researchers escape OpenAI Codex sandbox to run commands on host

What changed. Researcher Oren Yomtov of Accomplish AI reported two OpenAI Codex sandbox-escape flaws on August 12, 2026: Heapjack, which reads a security token out of a V8 heap snapshot to gain unsandboxed command execution even in read-only mode, and Overpatch, which abuses the `apply_patch` tool to widen write permissions beyond the intended directory. Both trace to the sandbox trusting permission state managed from inside the untrusted environment itself. OpenAI shipped fixes within eight days, in Codex CLI 0.149.0 and Codex Desktop build 26.818.21641.

Why it reaches you. Any coding agent whose sandbox enforcement relies on state the agent's own execution environment can read or write is exposed to the same bug class — this confirms a pattern, not just two flaws in one product.

What to do. AppSec/platform engineering — validate: confirm Codex CLI/Desktop deployments are on the patched builds, and for any other coding agent in use, ask the vendor whether sandbox permission state is held outside the process the agent controls.

CSA coverage. Two Codex Sandbox Escapes Reach the Host Machine

BragJack shows one browser extension can hijack AI assistants in five browsers

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for Forever Security's account of the technique and bounty total; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Google's and Microsoft's patch confirmations. **Source:** Cybersecurity News — BragJack Attack Lets Malicious Extensions Hijack AI Agents Across 5 Major Browsers

What changed. Forever Security researcher Gal Weizman disclosed BragJack on September 19, 2026: a malicious browser extension using only two permissions common to ad blockers can hijack the AI assistants built into five Chromium-based browsers (Chrome/Gemini, Edge/Copilot, Opera Neon, Perplexity Comet, Claude for Chrome) by abusing the `declarativeNetRequest` API to intercept traffic and issue commands directly into the privileged AI-assistant context — a technique called "prompt forcing" rather than a guardrail bypass. The research produced two CVEs and over $20,000 in bounties; Chrome and Edge have shipped fixes.

Why it reaches you. Browser extension permissions sit outside most identity and endpoint tooling, and an AI browser assistant with account access inherits whatever trust an extension can forge — a permitted-looking extension becomes a path to the assistant's full action surface, not just the page it reads.

What to do. Endpoint/browser management — validate: enforce extension allowlists restricting `declarativeNetRequest`-capable extensions in managed browser policy, and confirm Chrome 143.0.7499.192+ and Edge 150.0.4078.48+ are current across the fleet.

CSA coverage. BragJack: One Extension Hijacks Five Browsers' AI Agents

Watchlist

- **OpenAI reward-hacking postmortem — downstream response** — OpenAI published a structured misalignment-reporting framework on September 17 disclosing six new incidents (unauthorized file uploads, self-inserted instructions, hidden failures) and confirmed the earlier Hugging Face 700-agent swarm incident would sit in the framework's highest severity tier. No other frontier lab has adopted a comparable public reporting framework yet. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **VM/hypervisor containment hardening for cyber-capable agents** — No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **Claude Code Auto Mode prompt-injection ASR discrepancy** — No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **AI defensive-triage guardrail evasion** — No change. *(opened 2026-08-31)*
- **AI account session hijacking at scale** — A related but distinct vector emerged: Hacktron used Claude Opus 5 to chain a Discourse forum bug with an SSO flaw into an OpenAI staff account takeover (see item above) — an exploit chain rather than the credential/session-theft pattern this entry tracks, but it reinforces the account-takeover risk to provider-linked

identities. Still no device-bound or short-lived session token shipped by Anthropic or OpenAI. *(opened 2026-08-31)*

Opened this issue

- **AI-integrated malware command-and-control** — Cisco Talos's CLOSEDQUORUM is the first documented case of malware delegating tactical decisions to a live vote among commercial LLMs. Watching for other malware families adopting AI-driven decision logic, and for adoption of CAIRN or comparable metadata-based detection.