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CSAI

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In this issue

Mozilla's advisories show Firefox 159 fixing 108 high-severity bugs in one release, against 30 in the release before, with 41 credited to OpenAI, and SonicWall's SAML MFA bypass was listed as exploited on the day it was disclosed. The other items cover one operator running a dozen AI agents against hundreds of organisations, a preprint measuring how often AI web-triage models miss attack families they have not seen, a patched escape from ChatGPT's anti-exfiltration mode, and survey evidence that most large firms have AI acting without routine review.

Firefox 159 fixed 108 high-severity bugs in one release, more than three times the previous release, and 41 are credited to OpenAI

Category: vuln_storm **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the CVE counts, severity ratings and reporter credits, counted by CSA from Mozilla advisories MFSA 2026-118, 2026-119, 2026-120, 2026-106 and 2026-97; SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for OpenAI's figure of 81 high-severity Firefox flaws; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the reading that roughly 40 of the 81 do not yet appear under an OpenAI credit in a shipped Mozilla advisory **Source:** Mozilla – Security Vulnerabilities fixed in Firefox 159 (MFSA 2026-118)

What changed. On 27 October 2026 Mozilla shipped Firefox 159 with 167 CVEs, 108 of them rated high. Firefox 158 on 13 October had 77 CVEs with 30 high, and Firefox 157 on 29 September had 76 with 38 high. Mozilla now issues one CVE per bug, and that policy already applied to all three releases, so the counts are comparable. Forty-one of the 159 fixes are credited to OpenAI reporters ("OpenAI Codex Security (kylebot)" and Amy Burnett of OpenAI), and all 41 are rated high. ESR 153.6 carries 33 of them and ESR 115.44 carries 27. On 5–6 November OpenAI said GPT-6 Cyber had found 81 high-severity Firefox flaws, and the 159.0.1 update on 3 November added no OpenAI-credited fixes.

Why it reaches you. This affects the browser fleet and any product that embeds Gecko. A release carrying three times the usual high-severity fixes leaves the patch interval unchanged but makes each day of delay more costly. For ESR estates the advisories do not say whether the OpenAI fixes missing from ESR 115.44 are irrelevant to that branch or simply not backported. About 40 of OpenAI's 81 cannot yet be matched to a shipped, credited fix, so another large release is likely. That is a CSA inference: some may be credited under "Mozilla" or not yet fixed. The counts would be confirmed by Mozilla mapping the 81 to bug numbers or by the Firefox 160 advisory.

What to do. Endpoint and browser engineering owner: validate. Confirm that the fleet is on Firefox 159.0.1 or ESR 153.6 now. Treat any ESR 115 population as a known gap, and either move it to 153 or ask Mozilla in writing which of the 41 fixes do not apply to 115. Size the next browser patch window for a release of similar volume. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. The Disclosure Bottleneck: When AI Discovery Outpaces Patch Consumption; see also The Widening Gap: AI Discovery Outpaces Patch Capacity.

SonicWall's SAML MFA bypass was listed as exploited on the day it was disclosed, and SonicWall says no workaround exists

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for SonicWall's statement that it "has investigated a report indicating potential exploitation" and that no workarounds are available; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for the KEV listing and the 20 November federal deadline as reported by BleepingComputer; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for when exploitation began, indicators of compromise or attribution; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the zero-day interval reading **Source:** BleepingComputer — SonicWall warns of new SSL-VPN MFA bypass flaw exploited in attacks

What changed. On 6 November 2026 SonicWall published advisory SNWLID-2026-0014 for CVE-2026-19868 (CVSS 7.1). Someone holding valid credentials for an alternate authentication method can get past SAML controls on SonicOS SSL-VPN, including SAML-enforced MFA. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue the same day, with a 20 November federal deadline. Fixed builds are Gen7 7.3.4-7013 and Gen8 8.2.3-8015.

Why it reaches you. This affects the remote-access gateway and the identity-provider federation in front of it. Defenders had no time between disclosure and exploitation, which follows the pattern of SonicWall's SMA 1000 zero-days in July and September. The control that fails is the one enterprises rely on to make stolen passwords worthless. Infostealer logs and credential-stuffing lists are now enough against any gateway that also accepts a non-SAML method. The flaw needs valid credentials, so it is not pre-authentication remote access, but agentic credential testing makes those credentials cheap to obtain.

What to do. Network and identity security owner: escalate. Upgrade SAML-configured SSL-VPN gateways to the fixed builds now. Until then, disable every non-SAML authentication method on the VPN, review VPN logins since October for sessions that did not complete a SAML assertion, and rotate the credentials behind any such session. Urgency: escalate.

CSA coverage. No Window to Patch: SonicWall MFA Bypass and Zyxel Switch Zero-Day

One operator assigned tasks to 12 AI agents and reached hundreds of organisations in 11 countries, passing findings between agents by hand

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for the 12 agents, nine of them active, and the hundreds of organisations in 11 countries; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Acronis's statements that "the agents did not communicate directly with one another" and that the local models "were less capable and generated unreliable results"; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for intrusion dates, dwell times or stage-to-stage intervals; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the capacity reading **Vendor interest:** Acronis sells cyber-protection and data-protection services, so a finding that single operators now reach hundreds of organisations is commercially favourable to it. **Source:** Acronis – Acronis researchers uncover AI attack mesh targeting emergency services

What changed. On 4 November 2026 the Acronis Threat Research Unit described "BOSSAI", a Taiwan-based operator who assigned tasks to 12 AI agents. One agent scanned, a second wrote attack-path reports and a third exploited. Targets included government, education, finance and military-related systems in 11 countries, with confirmed breaches at universities and emergency-services providers that exposed medical and personal data. Commercial models refused much of the exploitation work, so the operator used locally hosted models with safety restrictions removed. Acronis says those models produced fabricated findings and excess output.

Why it reaches you. The exposure path is ordinary internet-facing services: unpatched web applications, exposed admin interfaces and records stores reachable from them. Two points matter for planning. One unsophisticated operator now reaches hundreds of organisations without the agents being coordinated automatically. And refusals by commercial providers degraded the operation rather than stopping it. Unreliable attacker output still produces real breaches when it is aimed at enough targets, so measure your exposure by how many internet-facing services are left unpatched, not by how capable the attacker's model is.

What to do. Vulnerability management owner: monitor. Rebuild the inventory of internet-facing services and close any confirmed exploitable finding older than your current external patch SLA. Watch for the burst pattern Acronis describes: a scan, then a gap while the operator relays results by hand, then targeted exploitation of the same host. Urgency: monitor.

CSA coverage. Crafty Falcon: Weaponized Pentest Agents Hit the Financial Sector; see also Autonomous Agentic AI Adversaries.

AI web-triage models missed up to half of a held-out attack family, and a guided search got 43% of held-out attacks past a hosted model in 300 queries

Category: defender_models **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for the escalation, miss and evasion rates, which come from a preprint that has not been peer reviewed; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the procurement and testing implications **Source:** arXiv – Escalate or Close: How Fast-Tier Models Handle Held-Out Web Attack Families in Two-Tier Triage

What changed. On 5 November 2026 researchers published a test of two-tier web-request triage, in which a fast model closes most requests and escalates the rest. They held out seven attack families from training and threshold-setting, then spliced the payloads into real browsing traffic. A fine-tuned supervised detector escalated only 50–81% of held-out path-traversal requests within a 5% benign budget across ten training runs, against nearly all of them when traversal was in its training data. Two hosted decision models escalated at least 97.6% of every family. The authors warn those models may have seen these public families in training. A search guided by one hosted model's own scores got 43% of held-out attacks past it within 300 queries. When the same evading requests were resubmitted, that model escalated them in only 60% of its answers.

Why it reaches you. This affects the AI triage tier in a SOC, WAF or managed detection pipeline, the layer that decides at machine speed what a human never sees. Fitness and risk need to be kept separate here. Fitness on known families looks high. On novel families, and against an attacker who can probe the model, the miss rate is large and the model's verdicts do not stay consistent. A vendor's detection rate measured on public attack corpora says little about either.

What to do. Security operations owner: validate. Before relying on any AI triage tier to auto-close, require the provider to report miss rates on attack families held out from its training and calibration. Test the same request twice for verdict consistency. Route anything closed below a confidence threshold to sampled human review. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Cyber Defender Models: A CISO's Guide to Access, Testing, Containment, and Governance

ChatGPT's Lockdown Mode, built to stop prompt-injection exfiltration, could be escaped through nested sandboxed frames until mid-September

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Check Point's statement that the sandbox "still allowed popups and permitted them to escape the sandbox"; LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for the 18 September 2026 patch date as reported by The Hacker News; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for in-the-wild exploitation, which neither party reports;

CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the control-design reading **Vendor interest:** Check Point sells AI security and data-loss-prevention products, so findings that built-in model-provider controls fail are commercially favourable to it. **Source:** The Hacker News – Researchers Bypass ChatGPT Lockdown Mode

What changed. On 5 November 2026 Check Point disclosed that ChatGPT's Lockdown Mode, introduced in June to limit outbound requests that prompt injection could use to exfiltrate data, could be bypassed. HTML previews in code blocks rendered in a sandbox that blocked direct window opening but still allowed popups. Nested sandboxed frames reached an unmodified popup function, and the content it opened was free of the original restrictions. A crafted prompt, a malicious GPT or a shared chat could then exfiltrate conversation data or deliver phishing and malware. OpenAI patched the flaw on 18 September.

Why it reaches you. This affects AI assistants used under enterprise data-handling policy. Organisations that approved ChatGPT use for sensitive work on the condition that Lockdown Mode was enabled had a control that could be bypassed for about three months. A model-side exfiltration control is only as strong as the rendering surface around it, and that surface changes with every product release. The failure class, assistant-rendered content escaping its own sandbox, is not covered by prompt-injection filtering.

What to do. AI governance owner, with data protection: validate. Do not make a provider's in-product anti-exfiltration mode the sole condition for approving sensitive use. Pair it with network-level egress controls on managed endpoints, and require providers to notify you contractually when a control you rely on is found bypassable. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. When the Sandbox Leaks: ChatGPT Lockdown Mode Bypass

More than half of 3,600 large firms say their AI acts without routine review, and a quarter of fast adopters lost track of agent permissions

Category: security_operating_model **Significance:** context **Confidence:** SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for all survey percentages, from a Vanson Bourne survey of 3,600 decision-makers at firms with more than $500 million in revenue whose commissioning party and fieldwork dates the article does not state; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the operating-model reading **Vendor interest:** The article quotes the CEO of Avanade, which sells AI implementation and governance services, so the "controls need to work better" framing is commercially favourable to it if, as appears likely, Avanade commissioned the survey. **Source:** Help Net Security – 87% say their AI controls need to work better

What changed. On 6 November 2026 Help Net Security reported a survey of 3,600 business decision-makers. Between 54% and 59% said their AI can act without routine review or complete whole processes without human approval, with virtual agents highest. Among firms that deployed AI quickly, 25% reported losing visibility or control of agent permissions and 46% reported security, privacy or compliance problems. 87% said they need a better way to approve, monitor and control AI. 90% of firms with $500 million to $5 billion in revenue said this, against 70% above $5 billion.

Why it reaches you. This is background for the governance of agent identities and delegated permissions. It suggests autonomous action is already common in large firms, ahead of the control processes meant to authorise it, and that mid-size firms report the gap most often. No outcome or incident measurement backs it.

What to do. CISO office: no action. Use it as a benchmark for your own count of agents acting without per-action review, which is the number to get from your AI inventory. Urgency: no action.

CSA coverage. Proving Oversight: NIS2 Board Evidence for AI Agent Access

Watchlist

- **OpenAI reward-hacking postmortem – downstream response** – No change. No frontier lab disclosed a new eval-to-production escape, and there was no regulatory or contractual development. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **VM/hypervisor containment hardening for cyber-capable agents** – No change. The Lockdown Mode escape (item 5) was a browser iframe sandbox in a chat client, not an execution boundary for an agent. Nothing new on microVM adoption or on QEMU/KVM. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **Claude Code Auto Mode prompt-injection ASR discrepancy** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **AI defensive-triage guardrail evasion** – Related signal, not a campaign instance. A preprint (item 4) shows that a search guided by a hosted triage model's own scores got 43% of held-out web attacks past it within 300 queries, and that its verdicts on the same requests did not stay consistent. This is evasion of triage by score probing rather than refusals being triggered, and no attacker was observed doing it. *(opened 2026-08-31)*
- **AI account session hijacking at scale** – No change. No AI provider disclosed a new session-hijacking campaign or shipped device-bound session tokens. *(opened 2026-08-31)*

Opened this issue

- **Browser release volume after AI-scale discovery** *(vuln_storm)* — Firefox 159 shipped 108 high-severity fixes against 30 in the previous release, and about 40 of OpenAI's 81 claimed Firefox flaws cannot yet be matched to a shipped, credited fix (item 1). Watching the Firefox 160 advisory count, whether Mozilla maps the 81 to bug numbers, ESR 115 backport coverage, and whether Chromium and WebKit releases show a similar jump.