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CSAI

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In this issue

An AI-assisted researcher published working exploits for more than 30 N-central flaws without notifying N-able, and the vendor took its hosted remote-management platform offline the next day and shipped a partial hotfix within two days. Railway's final report on its October breach says the attacker used agents and reached KMS decryption of customer secrets nearly 15 hours after its first alert, and the stolen AI keys ran up an estimated $740,000 that Railway will cover where providers will not refund. The other items cover Fireworks AI's widened breach, which was a second intrusion through a third-party cloud provider 17 days after the first; NEAR AI's confirmation that its enclave did not protect requests from a flaw in the inference engine running inside it; more than 35,000 Grok-built apps open to anyone without sign-in because the publish step preselected "Anyone with the link"; and Microsoft's November patch release, which takes its 2026 total past 5,100 fixes. We examined Microsoft's "Lazarus" research, which shows open-weight agent models can be backdoored by editing fewer than 10 neurons, and left it out of the items because it is a laboratory demonstration and Microsoft has not seen it used in the wild. CSA's note Seven Neurons to Root: Lazarus Weight-Edit Backdoors in Agent Models covers it.

An AI-assisted researcher dropped working exploits for 30-plus N-central flaws without notice, and N-able pulled its hosted platform offline within a day and shipped a partial fix in two

Category: vuln_storm **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for N-able's takedown, its on-premises shutdown advice, the seven CVEs fixed in 2026.4 HF2, and its statement that it has not observed exploitation; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for the researcher's account of AI-assisted discovery and of earlier reports that went unanswered for five to six months, which N-able did not address; SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for Defused's report of scanning and Shadowserver's fall in exposed servers from about 1,338 to about 148; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for reading this as a disclosure-process failure that turned AI discovery speed into an outage **Source:** BleepingComputer — N-able releases security hotfixes for zero-day vulnerabilities

What changed. Late on 8 November 2026, researcher Sean Bales published the "Able2Shell" repository, with proof-of-concept exploits for more than 30 alleged flaws in N-able's N-central remote monitoring and management platform. He told BleepingComputer the discovery was AI-assisted. He did not notify N-able, saying flaws he had reported in another N-able product five to six months earlier were still unpatched. On 9 November N-able took hosted N-central offline in all regions and told on-premises

customers to shut their servers down. On 10 November it released 2026.4 HF2, which N-able says fixes "some" of the flaws, including seven CVEs it calls the most critical, and reported all hosted servers upgraded. Defused observed attackers probing N-central for the flaws the same day. Exposed servers counted by Shadowserver fell from about 1,338 to about 148.

Why it reaches you. The component is the RMM platform, which holds remote-execution rights over every managed endpoint, often through a managed service provider you do not operate. The time from public exploit to vendor fix was about two days, but the time from public exploit to probing was also about two days, and the service was unavailable in between. The hotfix does not cover every published flaw. A single researcher's AI-assisted output forced a vendor-wide outage, and the trigger was a stalled disclosure channel, not the volume of findings alone.

What to do. IT operations owner, with the MSP relationship owner: escalate. Confirm every N-central instance, including any your MSP runs for you, is on 2026.4 HF2 or later and is not reachable from the internet. Ask the MSP in writing which of the published flaws remain unfixed and what compensating controls are in place until they are. Add to RMM supplier reviews a question on how the vendor handles reports it has not yet triaged. Urgency: escalate.

CSA coverage. Able2Shell: N-central Zero-Days and the RMM Kill Switch; see also When Discovery Outruns Remediation: Open-Source Disclosure Strain.

Railway says an agent-driven attacker reached KMS decryption of customer secrets nearly 15 hours after its first alert, and the stolen AI keys ran up an estimated $740,000 that Railway will cover where providers refuse

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Railway's timeline, its description of the attack as "a contest of agent speed" with "agent fanouts" and "abliterated models with no safeguards", and its refund positions by provider; SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for the ~$740,000 estimate, the upper bound of about 100,000 workspaces (1.85%), and 1,852 exposed linked-account tokens; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the reading that detection without automated containment did not stop decryption **Source:** Railway — Incident report: October security incident

What changed. On 10 November 2026 Railway published its final report on the October breach of its build infrastructure. The attacker escaped build isolation at 07:28 UTC on 20 October. Railway's on-call engineer was paged at 13:58, about six and a half hours later. The attacker then exploited a misconfigured OIDC binding at 03:26 on 21 October, began decrypting customer environment variables through a machine with KMS access at 04:42, and searched them for AI-provider key names. The attacker was evicted at 09:24, about 26 hours after entry and about 19.5 hours after the alert. Railway's preliminary report of 22 October had dated the start of the attack to the alert and placed decryption later than the

final report does. Railway estimates unauthorized spend on the stolen keys at about $740,000. It says AWS Bedrock and Google Gemini are refunding under fraud policies, OpenAI and SpaceXSI are reviewing case by case, OpenRouter will not refund, and Railway will cover OpenRouter and, for now, Anthropic charges itself.

Why it reaches you. The exposure path is any platform-as-a-service or CI host where you store AI-provider keys as environment variables. The decryption that mattered happened nearly 15 hours after Railway's responders were already engaged, so detection alone did not protect customer secrets. Who absorbs the loss depended on each AI provider's refund terms, not on your contract with the platform. Railway's changes are ephemeral per-build VMs, scoped push credentials, just-in-time service credentials, and audit logging on every encrypt and decrypt operation. They give a concrete checklist to ask your own hosts about.

What to do. Cloud platform owner, with procurement: validate. For each PaaS and CI provider that holds your AI keys, find out whether decrypt operations on your secrets are logged and visible to you. Move AI keys to per-workload, spend-capped credentials issued by the provider, and record each AI provider's refund position for fraudulent use before you need it. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Who Pays for Stolen Inference? Loss Allocation After Black October; see also Black October: AI Developer Platform Breaches and Industrialized LLMjacking.

NEAR AI says its enclave did not protect requests from an exploited flaw in the SGLang inference engine running inside it

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for NEAR AI's statement that confidential computing "does not protect against a vulnerability in the software running inside the environment", and for the impact figures (about 100 users' account details, 18 legacy agents' chat history, settings and logs, two customers' API keys); NO PROVIDER CLAIM on the CVE, the affected SGLang versions, the dates of exploitation and detection, or whether the SGLang project has released a fix; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the procurement implication **Source:** NEAR AI — Security incident report: SGLang vulnerability

What changed. On 9 November 2026 NEAR AI reported that an attacker used a remote code execution flaw in SGLang, the open-source inference engine, to run code on one of its inference servers. That server processes confidential-mode requests inside a trusted execution environment, and NEAR AI says the attacker could have seen requests on it on 8 November, including confidential ones. The attacker also moved beyond the server, reaching account details for about 100 users and the chat history, settings and

logs of 18 agents on a legacy deployment that did not run in the enclave. NEAR AI rotated credentials, replaced all agent tokens, deployed a fix across its inference servers, and reported the flaw to SGLang. It has not named a CVE or affected versions.

Why it reaches you. The component is the confidential-inference endpoint and the model-serving stack behind it, whether you buy it as a service or run SGLang and similar engines yourself. Remote attestation proves which code is loaded in the enclave. It does not prove that the code is free of exploitable flaws, and the enclave makes those flaws harder for the operator to see. An enterprise that accepted "runs in a TEE" as its confidentiality control for sensitive prompts or agent traffic has relied on a control that did not hold in this deployed case.

What to do. AI platform owner: validate. For every confidential-inference service you use, ask the provider which inference engine and version runs inside the enclave, how quickly it patches that engine, and how it monitors for compromise inside the enclave. If you run SGLang yourself, track the upstream advisory and keep inference servers off the internet until a fixed version is identified. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Inside the Enclave, Still Exposed: The NEAR AI SGLang Breach.

Fireworks AI's breach widened through a third-party cloud provider 17 days after the first intrusion, reaching customer datasets and incomplete model weights

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the dates, the third-party provider route, and the data categories accessed; NO PROVIDER CLAIM on the identity of the cloud provider, how it was compromised, or how many customers were affected; LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for Notion's statement that fewer than 1% of its workspaces were affected and that Notion AI chat transcripts were exposed, as reported by The Hacker News; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the reading that first-incident containment did not cover the provider's own suppliers **Source:** Fireworks AI – October 2026 security incident update

What changed. On 9 November 2026 Fireworks AI updated its October bulletin. The first intrusion, detected on 6 October, used stolen internal credentials to read secrets in evaluation jobs. Fireworks now says a third-party cloud provider hosting its R&D machines had a security incident on 23 October. On 24 October, 17 days after the first detection, the attacker used it to reach Fireworks development machines and run an unauthorized workload. That second intrusion reached billing data, resource metadata, secrets for a limited set of accounts, and a subset of customers' datasets and incomplete model weights. Fireworks reports no impact on inference or its Training SDK and has disabled self-serve dataset upload and download while it investigates. The Hacker News reports that Notion, a Fireworks customer, found Notion AI chat transcripts among the affected data and has stopped serving open-weight models through Fireworks.

Why it reaches you. The exposure path is the model-hosting and fine-tuning provider, and that provider's own infrastructure suppliers. Your training data and fine-tuned weights sit with them, and so does data your SaaS vendors send there for their AI features. The second intrusion came in through a route outside the first incident's scope while the provider was still responding. Two layers of supplier now stand between you and the place your data was lost.

What to do. Third-party risk owner: validate. Ask each model-hosting and fine-tuning provider to name the infrastructure providers that host its development and R&D environments, and to confirm whether customer datasets or weights are ever copied there. Ask your SaaS vendors which inference providers process your data for their AI features. Delete datasets and weights you no longer need from hosted providers. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Black October: Concentration Risk in the AI Build-and-Host Layer; see also Black October: AI Developer Platform Breaches and Industrialized LLMjacking.

More than 35,000 Grok-built apps were open to anyone without sign-in, because the publish step preselected "Anyone with the link"

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for the 37,571 apps found, the 35,578 open apps, and the estimate that about 1 in 10 held internal business or personal data; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for SpaceXSI's response that apps are "private until their creator chooses to share one" and that employee accounts default to "Only you"; LIVE TEST REQUIRED for the publish default in your organisation's own Grok accounts; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the broader app-builder pattern **Vendor interest:** Claroc sells tools for finding and securing AI-built apps, so the finding is commercially favourable to it. **Source:** Claroc – GhostShares: Grok Build apps

What changed. On 10 November 2026 Claroc reported that of 37,571 apps built with Grok's app builder and still online, 35,578 opened without any sign-in. Grok's publish panel offered "Anyone with the link", "Invited users" and "Only you", with the first already selected. The apps sit on grok.me subdomains that appear in passive DNS records, so they can be found by search. About 1 in 10 open apps held internal data, including plaintext employee passwords, a hospital staff directory and a patient briefing. Claroc identified data from 30 organisations, 6 of them in the Fortune 500. In a test app of its own, the generated code added each signed-in user to the team before checking membership, so any account got in. SpaceXSI removed 24 apps built by its own and X staff, but not other users' apps.

Why it reaches you. The component is the AI app builder that employees use outside IT oversight to turn internal data into hosted apps. Two controls failed together. The sharing default exposed apps to anyone, and the agent-generated access check did not check access. Neither shows up in your identity provider or data-loss tooling, because the data has already left for the builder's hosting.

What to do. Data protection owner: validate. Search passive DNS and proxy logs for your staff's use of AI app-builder domains, including grok.me. Have the owners of any app holding internal data set it to "Invited users" or "Only you", test it from an outside account, and remove credentials from its code. Add AI app builders to your sanctioned-tool policy with a stated default-sharing requirement. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Public by Default: Exposed Grok Apps and the AI App-Builder Leak Pattern.

Microsoft fixed 1,093 vulnerabilities in November and more than 5,100 so far in 2026, against about 100 a month a year ago

Category: vuln_storm **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Microsoft's attribution of the higher volume to AI-assisted discovery, as reported; SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for the 1,093 total, 63 critical, 535 elevation-of-privilege flaws, and the single exploited flaw, CVE-2026-124194; LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for the November count, which other trackers put at 1,252 to 1,259 depending on whether third-party and non-Windows CVEs are included; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the capacity reading **Source:** Krebs on Security – Microsoft Fixes Nearly 1,100 Security Vulnerabilities

What changed. On 10 November 2026 Microsoft's Patch Tuesday fixed 1,093 vulnerabilities, 63 of them critical and 535 allowing elevation of privilege. One, CVE-2026-124194, a spoofing flaw in Outlook, is already exploited. October's release fixed more than 1,400. Microsoft has now shipped more than 5,100 fixes in 2026, against an average of about 100 a month a year ago, and credits advances in AI for helping find and fix them. Counts differ by tracker. CrowdStrike and The Hacker News report 1,252 and 1,259, apparently because they include CVEs Microsoft did not author.

Why it reaches you. The component is the Windows and Microsoft 365 patch pipeline: test rings, compatibility checks, change approval and reboot windows. Those were sized for roughly 100 fixes a month, and they now receive more than ten times that. Severity labels alone no longer narrow the set: 63 critical fixes is more than many organisations once received in total each month. Only one flaw is known to be exploited, so the task is to deploy a large cumulative update reliably and quickly rather than to triage it.

What to do. Vulnerability management owner: monitor. Measure how long your Windows estate takes to reach 95% deployment of each month's cumulative update. Track that interval monthly against the fix count, so you can show whether patch throughput is keeping pace with the volume. Apply the Outlook fix on the exploited-flaw timeline now. Urgency: monitor.

CSA coverage. The Disclosure Bottleneck: When AI Discovery Outpaces Patch Consumption; see also VulnOps: Vulnerability Management in the Age of AI.

Watchlist

- **OpenAI reward-hacking postmortem – downstream response** – No change. No frontier lab disclosed an eval-to-production escape, and there was no new regulatory or contractual development. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **VM/hypervisor containment hardening for cyber-capable agents** – Adjacent signal only. Railway's remediation after an agent-driven build-isolation escape moves every build onto a dedicated ephemeral VM (item 2). That is a hosting-platform change, not an agent-sandbox move to hardened microVMs, and there is no new QEMU/KVM/libslirp patch news. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **Claude Code Auto Mode prompt-injection ASR discrepancy** – No change. There is no Anthropic patch or public response to the reproduced attack success rate. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **AI defensive-triage guardrail evasion** – No change. No new campaign that triggers refusals to blind triage tooling was reported. Railway's statement that its attacker used "abliterated models with no safeguards" is the opposite case: the attacker avoided refusals on its own tooling rather than triggering them on defenders'. *(opened 2026-08-31)*
- **AI account session hijacking at scale** – No change. Railway's exposure of 1,852 users' GitHub OAuth tokens and BYOK agent keys (item 2) concerns tokens stored on a hosting platform, not AI-provider user sessions. No AI provider disclosed a session-hijacking campaign or shipped device-bound session tokens. *(opened 2026-08-31)*