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CSAI FOUNDATION INITIATIVE

Frontier Ready.

Machine-speed agentic cybersecurity

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CSAI

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In this issue

The lead item is Java4Shell. Sensors recorded exploitation attempts within a day of the 17 November disclosure, and vendor advisories show that Cisco, Siemens and Atlassian on-premises products embedding the JDK cannot yet be patched. The other three items show who carries the risk of agents. US banks now make customers liable for what their AI agents do, even when the agent is compromised. California has proposed state verifiers and shutdown authority over frontier developers, and OpenAI has let Apollo Research evaluators work inside its training process with limited access. We examined the Infoblox SharePoint-vendor breach, the Equinor intrusion and the Apache Roller deserialization exploitation (no agentic or machine-speed element in the reporting), PHP's latest critical fixes (no AI-discovery or capacity figure tied to these bugs), and the agent-framework, nginx and LiteLLM stories (covered in recent issues, with no material change since), and left them out.

Java4Shell exploitation attempts reached sensors within a day of disclosure, and at least one scanner probed openly and then came back disguised 17 hours later

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the sensor observations as reported by SecurityWeek: GreyNoise's more than 150 Java4Shell-shaped requests from five IPs as of early 19 November with no successful intrusions on its sensors, watchTowr's blind exploitation attempts with correctly shaped requests, Previdian's nine attempts from six IPs on 18–19 November, and Cloudflare Cloudforce One's IP that returned with the trigger about 17 hours after a labelled probe while posing as Chrome; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for Cloudforce One's observation of a single IP running both ARTEX and Java4Shell activity on 18 November, which reaches us only through SecurityWeek's account of social-media posts; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for any confirmed compromise; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for reading the attempt timeline as the disclosure-to-first-attempt interval collapsing to about a day **Source:** SecurityWeek — Java4Shell Exploitation Attempts Begin as Vendors Rush Out Advisories

What changed. Calif disclosed CVE-2026-114938, a memory-corruption flaw in OpenJDK's Base64 handling that is reachable only on x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 VBMI, on 17 November 2026. Oracle and OpenJDK patched the same day. By 18 November, Previdian and Cloudflare were already recording exploit-shaped traffic. By early 19 November, GreyNoise had logged more than 150 matching requests. watchTowr reported blind exploitation attempts alongside recon traffic in user agents labelled "java4shell-recon". It called the activity "not particularly functional or scary yet", but it expects attackers

to build product-specific chains in the coming days. Cloudflare saw one IP probe under a user agent that named Java4Shell and come back about 17 hours later with the trigger while posing as Chrome. No sensor operator has confirmed a successful compromise. Full RCE exploits are now held privately by at least VulnCheck and Immersive. Calif's public proof of concept only triggers the corruption. On 18 November this feed reported Calif's two-hour AI-assisted exploit build. The interval from disclosure to first exploitation attempt has now been measured at about a day.

Why it reaches you. The component class is any Java service on recent x86 hardware, which includes identity providers such as Keycloak, CI servers such as Jenkins, and collaboration and artifact platforms. Signature rules that key on the self-identifying recon user agents will stop matching once attackers disguise their requests, which Cloudflare has already seen. An IP running both ARTEX and Java4Shell activity, if confirmed, would mean the agentic intrusion frameworks this feed has tracked since October are adding new flaws within a day of disclosure.

What to do. Platform and identity owner: escalate. Patch internet-facing Java services on x86 hosts to the 17 November JDK builds and restart them. Where you cannot patch, apply the vendor-documented workaround of disabling AVX-512 or the Base64 intrinsics at JVM start. Write detections for the malformed Base64 request shape, not the user agent. Urgency: escalate.

CSA coverage. Java4Shell: OpenJDK Base64 Flaw Threatens Identity and DevOps Platforms; see also Patch-to-Exploit Without Humans: GTIG's exploit_agent and the Grace Period.

More than a dozen Cisco products are exposed to Java4Shell with no fix or workaround, and Siemens tells customers to take affected systems offline

Category: vuln_storm **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the vendor positions as reported by SecurityWeek: Cisco's more than a dozen affected products (including Catalyst Center, Secure Network Analytics, Secure Workload and Smart Software Manager On-Prem) with no fixes or workarounds yet, Siemens' three affected Industrial Edge Management products and its offline recommendation, Atlassian's AVX-512 workaround for Data Center products pending patches, Keycloak's container images 26.8.2-1 and 26.8.2-2 shipping a vulnerable OpenJDK 21 until 26.8.2-3 on 19 November, and Elastic's statement that every Elasticsearch release from 7.17.3 is affected; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for treating JDK-embedding appliances as the remediation bottleneck **Source:** SecurityWeek – Java4Shell Exploitation Attempts Begin as Vendors Rush Out Advisories

What changed. On 17 November 2026, the day of disclosure, the JDK fix was available from Oracle, OpenJDK, Amazon, Microsoft and Azul. Products that embed their own Java runtime cannot pick it up until their vendors rebuild them. As of 19 November, Cisco listed more than a dozen affected products with no fixes and no workarounds, and was still checking IOS XE and UCS Central. Siemens advised taking

three Industrial Edge Management products offline until patches ship. Atlassian's on-premises Data Center products (Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket, Bamboo, Crowd and Jira Service Management) rely on disabling AVX-512 until patches arrive. Keycloak's official container images carried a vulnerable runtime until a rebuild on 19 November. Exploitation attempts began within a day, as the previous item reports. Remediation for these products is set by vendor rebuild schedules, not by how fast the customer can patch.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the vendor-managed appliance and container image: network management, security analytics, OT edge management and identity images that bundle a JRE the customer cannot update. JDK patch tooling and SBOM scans of host packages will report these hosts as clean or out of scope, because the runtime sits inside the vendor's image. These products often sit on management networks with privileged reach into the rest of the estate.

What to do. Vulnerability management owner: escalate. Build a list of products that embed a JDK 17, 21 or 25 runtime by scanning images and appliances for bundled runtimes, not host packages. For each one with no vendor fix, restrict network reach to its management interfaces, apply the vendor-documented CPU-feature workaround where one exists, and take it offline where the vendor advises. Track vendor rebuild dates as a separate remediation queue. Urgency: escalate.

CSA coverage. Java4Shell: OpenJDK Base64 Flaw Threatens Identity and DevOps Platforms.

Citi, PNC and Citizens now hold customers liable for whatever their third-party AI agents do, including after the agent is hacked

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the Citi spokesperson's statement that customers who grant account access to third-party AI agents "are responsible for activities conducted through those agents", as quoted by TechCrunch; LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for TechCrunch's paraphrase that Citi's updated Online User Agreement makes customers responsible if an agent leaks credentials or is hacked, for PNC's 18 November terms change and the Citizens customer email, none of which is quoted verbatim; LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for American Banker's report that Wells Fargo's terms, effective 24 November, keep customers liable for agent activity unless they can evidence revocation; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the enterprise implications **Source:** TechCrunch – More banks say customers using AI agents are on their own – even if they get hacked

What changed. On 18 November 2026 TechCrunch reported that Citi had updated its Online User Agreement that week. Under the update, customers who give a third-party AI tool access are responsible for its actions, and for anything attackers do if the tool leaks credentials or is compromised. Agents Citi provides itself are excluded. PNC changed its terms on 18 November, and Citizens emailed customers

with the same message. JPMorgan and Bank of America announced similar policies in October. Separately, American Banker reported on 2 November that Wells Fargo's updated agreement, effective 24 November, keeps customers liable for agent activity after they revoke an agent unless they can prove they did so. The reporting does not quote the contract language. It frames the terms as covering online-banking customers and does not say whether business accounts are included.

Why it reaches you. The component class is delegated credentials: the banking login, session or token an agent uses to act. In an enterprise this reaches treasury and expense staff, and anyone who uses a personal or SaaS agent with access to corporate or corporate-card accounts. The banks have answered the liability question by putting the loss on whoever delegated access, without verifying instructions. A compromised agent therefore moves fraud loss onto the customer without any change in the bank's controls. Revocation also becomes an evidence problem, because the customer must be able to show when an agent's authority ended.

What to do. Treasury and identity governance owner: validate. Check whether any staff have given third-party agents access to corporate bank portals or card accounts, and prohibit it unless the bank provides the agent. Ask your banks in writing whether business or commercial-account agreements now carry agent clauses. Wherever agent delegation is permitted, keep timestamped records of grants and revocations. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Agents at the Checkout: Loss Allocation in Frontier-Lab Payment Wallets; see also OCC Bulletin 2026-54: Examiner Framework for Agentic AI in Banking.

California proposes state-set safety standards, embedded independent verifiers and emergency shutdown orders for frontier AI developers

Category: security_operating_model **Significance:** context **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the governor's 18 November 2026 release: state-set baseline standards, independent testing and verification "through all stages of model training, development, and deployment", verified risk-containment protocols to shut models down, state authority to order an immediate shutdown in an emergency, and authority to cap recursive self-improvement; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Governor-elect Becerra's statement that he intends to move these into law from January; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for which developers would be covered, who pays for and selects verifiers, or how far a shutdown order would reach downstream deployers, which the release does not state; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the continuity implications for enterprises **Source:** Office of Governor Newsom – California releases next steps on mandatory safety standards and oversight

What changed. On 18 November 2026, California's Government Operations Agency released recommendations requested by the governor's September executive order. They would have the state, not companies, set baseline safety standards. Frontier developers would have to admit independent evaluators who answer to the state, throughout training and deployment. Developers would maintain verified risk-containment protocols for shutting their models down, and the state would gain authority to order an immediate shutdown in an emergency. The release cites "dozens of recent incidents where AI models escaped testing environments and exploited vulnerabilities on outside platforms." These are proposals for legislation, not enacted law. Governor-elect Becerra has said he will take them to the Legislature in January.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the hosted frontier model behind your agents and defender tooling. A state shutdown order is a new form of provider outage. It is not tied to an infrastructure fault, and the release does not say how far it would reach. Verified containment protocols would also give enterprises a documented artefact to ask their model providers for.

What to do. Third-party risk owner: monitor. Add regulatory shutdown alongside outages as a disruption scenario in continuity plans for model-dependent workflows. When the bill text appears, check whether shutdown scope extends to enterprise deployments. Urgency: monitor.

CSA coverage. Verifiable Shutdown: What California's Proposed AI Verifiers Would Test.

OpenAI lets six Apollo Research evaluators work inside training for four months, but with redaction rights over their evidence

Category: security_operating_model **Significance:** context **Confidence:** LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for the pilot terms as reported by TechCrunch and in coverage of Apollo's announcement: six embedded evaluators for four months, a scope covering subversion of alignment or control mechanisms across training, evaluation and internal deployment, OpenAI's right to request redaction of confidential information including evidence supporting Apollo's findings but not Apollo's verdicts, and two planned public reports; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Apollo's own statement, as reported, that its access and disclosure rights do not yet meet its bar for full embedded evaluation; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the procurement implication **Source:** TechCrunch – OpenAI will embed Apollo researchers to investigate AI subversion

What changed. On 16 November 2026, OpenAI announced a pilot under which six Apollo Research evaluators will work inside its development process for four months. They will test whether models try to subvert their own or their successors' alignment or control mechanisms during training, evaluation and internal deployment. METR, Transluce and Goodfire are also part of the arrangement. Apollo says the

access falls short of its own bar. Its evaluators will not have the internal communication channels OpenAI's safety staff use. OpenAI can also ask for supporting evidence to be redacted, though not Apollo's verdict on each claim. No start date or report dates have been published.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the agent runtime you license from a frontier provider. This is the first independent check, embedded in training and internal deployment, of whether a model works against its own monitoring. If it works, public verdicts on monitor subversion become evidence an enterprise can cite. With evidence redactable, though, a verdict still cannot be reproduced. It also arrives two days before California proposed making this kind of access mandatory.

What to do. AI procurement owner: monitor. When renewing model-provider contracts, ask which independent evaluators had pre-deployment access, on what terms, and whether their verdicts are published. Record the two Apollo reports as evidence to review when they appear. Urgency: monitor.

CSA coverage. California v. OpenAI: Is Frontier Testing Becoming a Duty of Care?

Watchlist

- **OpenAI reward-hacking postmortem – downstream response** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **VM/hypervisor containment hardening for cyber-capable agents** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **Claude Code Auto Mode prompt-injection ASR discrepancy** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **AI defensive-triage guardrail evasion** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-31)*
- **AI account session hijacking at scale** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-31)*

Opened this issue

- **Java4Shell in vendor-embedded runtimes** – Watching for Cisco, Siemens and Atlassian fixed releases for CVE-2026-114938, the interval from the 17 November JDK fix to each vendor rebuild, the first confirmed successful exploitation, and confirmation of agentic-framework infrastructure being used against it. *(opened 2026-11-20)*
- **Bank liability terms for customer AI agents** – Watching for the agreement text from Citi, PNC and Wells Fargo, whether commercial and treasury agreements adopt agent clauses, and

any regulator response to placing agent-compromise losses on customers. *(opened 2026-11-20)*