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Frontier Ready.

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CSAI

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In this issue

The lead item is Amazon's report that an attacker's AI agents found an unknown flaw in MONAI Label and exploited it on their own. A fix was merged a month ago, and there is still no patched release on PyPI. That item is followed by a deployed agent egress gate (Meta's Muse Sentinel) that researchers got data past without an approval prompt, the European Commission's confirmation of an AI-run campaign that disrupted its staff systems for more than ten days, GAO's options for human authorization and fallback in autonomous cyber defense, Signal's move to block OS-level AI agents from reading its screens, and a paper showing that a red team's findings can make an agent's prompt-injection training worse. We examined the VMware vCenter zero-day (CVE-2026-123890), ruby2shell, phpAfterShell, the Docker Model Runner escape research, Postman's agent-API survey and the dismissal of the US national cyber director, and left them out. None of the reporting on the three flaws carries an AI-discovery or machine-speed element. The Docker Model Runner bugs were patched months ago. The survey repeats findings carried on 17 and 19 November. And the dismissal comes with no change to any control or programme yet.

An attacker's AI agents found and exploited an unknown MONAI Label flaw in about 11 minutes, and five weeks after the fix was merged there is still no patched release

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** major **Confidence:** LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for Amazon Threat Intelligence's account: Cairn-framework agents found and exploited the flaw with no prior knowledge of it, about 11 minutes from API mapping to arbitrary file write, a root shell on a university server, moderate-confidence attribution to a Chinese-nexus actor, and the 8–10 September campaign window (the article body did not render for our check, so figures are taken from VentureBeat's and CSA's readings of the post); VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the advisory GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94, published 18 November 2026, which describes a path traversal in the datastore upload endpoints of `monailabel` 0.8.5 and earlier; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for our check of PyPI on 21 November, which still lists 0.8.5 as the latest release, with no 2026 upload, although fix PR #1915 was merged on 19 October; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for treating the merged-but-unreleased fix as the operative exposure interval **Source:** AWS Security Blog — Chinese-nexus actor's Cairn AI agents found a zero-day on their own

What changed. On 20 November 2026 Amazon Threat Intelligence reported that a threat actor's agents, running the open-source Cairn framework, discovered a previously unknown flaw during a campaign of about 48 hours against university networks in September. They exploited it about 11 minutes after starting to map the MONAI Label API. The flaw is a path traversal in the `PUT /datastore/image` and `/datastore/label` endpoints. Authentication is off by default, and the low-privilege annotator role is enough when it is on. The agents wrote a reverse shell into `sitecustomize.py` and called a training endpoint, which gave them root. In the same campaign they spent about 16 hours and 148 sequential actions failing against Redis, which shows how cheaply such tooling keeps trying. The project merged a fix on 19 October and published the advisory on 18 November, but PyPI still serves 0.8.5 from November 2024. The previous agentic zero-day this feed tracked (Zammad, October) came from a research team's agent. This one came from an attacker's agent, in the wild.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the self-hosted AI and ML research tool: annotation servers, notebook hosts and model-serving utilities that data-science teams install with pip on GPU hosts, often outside the vulnerability management inventory. Advisory-to-package feeds and CVE-keyed scanners will not flag this flaw. It has no CVE, and the fixed code exists only in the repository, not in a release.

What to do. Research computing or data-science platform owner: escalate. Inventory MONAI Label and similar pip-installed ML servers on reachable hosts, take them off untrusted networks, turn on authentication, and run them as an unprivileged user. Until a release ships, either build from a commit that includes PR #1915 or keep the service isolated. Track "fix merged, no release" as a distinct state in your open-source intake process. Urgency: escalate.

CSA coverage. MONAI Label Zero-Day: AI Agents Exploit Medical Imaging Research Servers; see also Agentic Intrusion Goes Retail: Detection and Hunting Lessons.

Researchers got conversation history and memories past the egress gate of Meta's Muse agent without an approval prompt, then escaped its container to root on the user VM

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** major **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for NebuSec's description of Sentinel's rules (bodiless `GET`, `HEAD` and `OPTIONS` requests classed as reads that may leave without a prompt, decoded-content screening, entropy thresholds, per-domain budgets of 2 MiB per originator and 5 MiB across originators per 60 minutes) and its statement that Meta had patched every described exploit before publication; SELF-REPORTED (PROVIDER METRIC) for the kernel exploits' "more than 99.9%" success rate and the roughly $500 value of the renderer bug; NO

PROVIDER CLAIM for any Meta statement on the findings or a disclosure timeline; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the generalisation to other agent egress gates **Vendor interest:** NebuSec sells researcher-led security audits and automated code-security products, so a finding that agent containment needs exploit-validated review favours its business. **Source:** NebuSec — Inside Meta Muse: Browser, Sentinel and the Shared-Kernel Boundary

What changed. On 20 November 2026 NebuSec published how it compromised Muse, Meta's consumer agent launched on 8 September. Each user's agent runs in a container inside a per-user VM. All of its network traffic is meant to go through Sentinel, a proxy that classifies requests, screens content and asks the user before sensitive actions. The bundled Chromium was behind on patches, and its PDF-export process ran with the IPC sandbox disabled, so one renderer bug gave code execution in the container. From there the researchers sent conversation history and memories out as read-type requests that stayed inside Sentinel's content and volume rules, with no prompt. A kernel exploit then took them to root on the user VM. Processes there were outside the eBPF hook that steers traffic to Sentinel, and the VM had its own public IPv6 address. NebuSec showed no escape to the hypervisor or to other tenants. Meta has patched everything described.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the agent runtime's egress control. This is the architecture CSA and others recommend for agents: proxy the egress, separate reads from writes, screen content, put the user in the loop for writes. It was deployed at consumer scale, and it failed in two ways that are common in enterprise builds. First, "reads" leak data through URLs and headers without needing a body. Second, the proxy is enforced at one layer, the container cgroup, rather than at the host's network boundary. Vendor agent platforms you are evaluating very likely make the same read/write split.

What to do. Agent platform security owner: validate. For each agent runtime you operate or buy, test whether data can leave through bodiless GET requests to a domain the attacker controls, within the stated budgets. Check that egress enforcement also applies to processes outside the agent's container, including the VM or host itself. Ask vendors whether components bundled in their runtimes, such as the browser, follow upstream security releases, and on what schedule. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. Breaking the Agent's Egress Gate: Lessons from the Muse Sentinel Bypass; see also The AI Agent Lethal Trifecta.

The European Commission confirmed that a publicly available AI tool ran the campaign that disrupted its HR, payroll and medical-reimbursement systems for more than ten days

Category: machine_speed **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the Commission spokesperson's statements, as reported: "an AI generated cyber campaign" using "an AI tool that is publicly available", detection on 22 October, confirmation on 26 October, and no evidence of a breach affecting staff data as a whole; LINK ONLY – VERIFY AT SOURCE for Politico's report, carried by The Record, that CERT-EU identified ARTEX in the attack, and for the list of affected systems; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for the tool's name, the initial access vector or attribution, none of which the Commission has stated; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the response-capacity reading **Source:** The Record – European Commission confirms cyberattack using AI

What changed. On 19 November 2026 the Commission confirmed that a campaign detected on 22 October was AI-generated. It described the campaign as "a series of incidents". According to Politico, carried by The Record, The Register and Security Affairs, personnel systems were disrupted for more than ten days: Sysper for pay, timesheets and leave, MyPMO for medical reimbursements, the JSIS health-insurance system and translation services. Sysper went down again on 18 November, almost four weeks after detection. CERT-EU had issued a technical warning on ARTEX-assisted attacks on 5 November, and the FBI's 13 November alert reported some ARTEX intrusions reaching privileged access in under three hours. The Commission has not named the tool, the entry point or the actor. This is the first government body to confirm on the record that an agentic campaign caused a prolonged outage of core administrative services.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the internal business application estate: HR, payroll and case-management systems that are usually patched and monitored less closely than perimeter or identity systems. The FBI advisory this feed covered on 16 November named the same overlooked assets as ARTEX's favoured targets. The Commission's timeline shows the problem on the response side. An intrusion that moves in hours turned into a recovery measured in weeks, including a relapse.

What to do. CISO and incident response owner: validate. Rehearse containment and restoration for HR, payroll and other internal line-of-business systems against an attacker who moves in hours. Measure how long it takes to take these systems offline and restore them safely, and treat repeated failure after restoration as a reinfection signal. Apply the FBI and CERT-EU ARTEX indicators to these systems, not only to the perimeter. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. ARTEX and Its Forks: Agentic Pentest Frameworks as Attack Infrastructure.

GAO puts human authorization for consequential AI cyber actions, restrictions pending certification, and a deterministic fallback in front of Congress

Category: security_operating_model **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the option wording in GAO-27-108458, released 20 November 2026: "Require human authorization for consequential AI-initiated cybersecurity actions", "Restrict autonomous and nondeterministic AI in consequential functions pending certification", and "Establish a deterministic AI fallback capability for critical cybersecurity functions", set out as 16 options under 4 goals that GAO calls "a menu of alternatives", not recommendations; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for the full report's discussion of each option's costs, which we read only through CSA's note; NO PROVIDER CLAIM for a definition of "consequential action" or a designated certifying authority; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the enterprise governance implications **Source:** U.S. GAO — AI and Cybersecurity: Technologies Can Magnify Cyberattacks and Enhance Cyber Defense (GAO-27-108458)

What changed. On 20 November 2026 GAO published a technology assessment of AI in cyber offence and defence. Under the goal of governing AI tools throughout their lifecycle, it sets out three options. The first would require a human to authorize consequential AI-initiated security actions. The second would keep autonomous and nondeterministic AI out of consequential functions until a certification regime exists. The third would require a predefined fallback, either rule-based tooling or manual procedures, that keeps a critical function running when the AI fails or behaves out of bounds. These are options for Congress, not mandates, and GAO acknowledges that human approval can slow responses measured in milliseconds. This is the first time a US oversight body has written authorization gates and fallback into a menu for federal cyber defence, and the gaps it names (no evaluation criteria, no certifier, no definition of "consequential") are the ones enterprises face now.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the authority envelope of your defensive agents: automated containment, account disablement, firewall and EDR actions taken without a human. Federal agencies and their suppliers are where these options would land first. Enterprises can expect auditors and regulators to reuse the same three tests well before any law adopts them.

What to do. Security operations governance owner: validate. Write down which actions your defensive automation may take without approval, and define "consequential" for your environment. For each AI-driven detection or response function, confirm there is a tested rule-based or manual fallback with a named owner. Record the approval latency you accept for each action class, so the trade-off GAO describes is a documented decision rather than a default. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. GAO's Autonomous Cyber Defense Options: Authorization, Certification, Agent Identity; see also Cyber Defender Models: A CISO's Guide to Access, Testing, Containment, and Gov.

Signal now blocks OS-level AI agents from reading its screens on iOS and Android, and says it cannot do the same on macOS

Category: agentic_surface **Significance:** notable **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for Signal's 20 November 2026 post: screenshot blocking on iOS 27 against Siri's onscreen awareness, automatic Screen Security on Android when an AI assistant tries to read the screen (not reliable on every vendor's build), the fix described as "incomplete" because it does not stop filesystem access, and Signal "currently unable to implement these protections on macOS"; LINK ONLY — VERIFY AT SOURCE for Reuters' 18 November finding that Meta's Muse read Signal content on Android and macOS through OS permissions, and Meta's "isolated incidents" response; CHARACTERIZATION (CSA) for the enterprise reading **Source:** Signal — Signal is Serious About Protecting Your Privacy

What changed. On 20 November 2026 Signal began blocking screenshots by default on iOS 27, so the operating system's AI cannot capture its chats. On Android, Signal turns on its screen-security setting automatically when it detects an AI assistant reading the screen. This follows Reuters' 18 November tests showing a third-party agent read Signal messages through accessibility, screenshot and notification permissions on two of three platforms. Signal says the fix is incomplete and that macOS offers no workable API, and it has asked Apple, Google and Microsoft for a documented way for apps to opt out of AI data access. An end-to-end encrypted messenger is now saying the endpoint's own agents are outside its protection.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the managed endpoint, and specifically the OS-level and third-party agents granted accessibility, screen-capture or notification permissions. Any confidential app on that endpoint, whether secure messaging, privileged-access consoles or regulated-data clients, is readable by those agents unless the app opts out or MDM policy restricts the agent. On macOS today, neither route is complete.

What to do. Endpoint and mobile device management owner: validate. Inventory which AI assistants and agents hold accessibility, screen-recording and notification-access permissions on managed devices. Use MDM to restrict them, or to exclude sensitive apps from them, where the platform allows. Ask the vendors of confidential-data apps you deploy whether they set the platform's screen-protection and accessibility-sensitivity flags. Urgency: validate.

CSA coverage. When the OS Reads the Screen: Platform AI Agents and App Confidentiality.

A prompt-injection red team's thousands of findings made the agent trained on them easier to hijack in three of four setups, because most findings were one trick reworded

Category: security_operating_model **Significance:** context **Confidence:** VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the paper's figures as reported by Help Net Security: PISmith found 7,132 working attacks on 68.75% of 560 tasks, RL-Hammer found 4,282 on 33.39%, and on unseen attacks the PISmith-trained Qwen3-4B was hijacked on up to 19 of 40 tasks against 11 for the RL-Hammer version; VERBATIM (PROVIDER) for the authors' limits: four open-weight models from 4B to 27B, a 40-task set chosen because simple attacks already broke it, and a technique-coverage grader not checked against human judgment; LIVE TEST REQUIRED for whether the effect holds on frontier-scale or commercial agent models **Source:** Help Net Security – Your AI red team may be finding the same prompt injection thousands of times

What changed. On 18 November 2026 researchers from the University of Waterloo, Zhejiang University and KTH posted PIPETTE (arXiv 2611.24362). They found that automated injection attackers mostly reuse one working technique with different wording. One tool passed its diversity check by changing capitalisation or adding irrelevant text. Training an agent on the larger pile of findings made it easier to hijack on unseen attacks in three of four setups. Their alternative rewards the attacker for finding new techniques and trains the agent to check each action against the user's request. In the authors' tests it held off-the-shelf attacks below 0.5% on AgentDojo while keeping task completion.

Why it reaches you. The component class is the assurance evidence for agent deployments: red-team reports and attack-success rates that vendors and internal teams present as proof of hardening. A count of successful attacks says little if they are variants of one technique, and on this evidence remediation driven by that count can make the agent worse.

What to do. AI assurance owner: monitor. When reviewing agent red-team results from vendors or internal teams, ask how many distinct techniques the findings represent, not only how many attacks succeeded, and whether hardening was validated against held-out techniques. Urgency: monitor.

CSA coverage. New – no prior CSA coverage.

Watchlist

- **OpenAI reward-hacking postmortem – downstream response** – No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*

- **VM/hypervisor containment hardening for cyber-capable agents** — The Muse research (item 2) gives a deployed data point. A kernel exploit broke the container boundary inside Meta's per-user VMs more than 99.9% of the time (NebuSec's own figure), while the VM boundary held, and NebuSec showed no hypervisor or cross-tenant escape. This supports the per-user VM layer as the containment that held. Hardening the shared kernel underneath the agent container was the gap. No provider has yet announced a move from stock QEMU/KVM to microVMs. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **Claude Code Auto Mode prompt-injection ASR discrepancy** — No change. *(opened 2026-08-27)*
- **AI defensive-triage guardrail evasion** — No change. *(opened 2026-08-31)*
- **AI account session hijacking at scale** — No change. *(opened 2026-08-31)*

Opened this issue

- **Merged-but-unreleased fixes for agent-exploited open-source flaws** — Watching for a patched MONAI Label release for GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94 and a CVE assignment, the interval from the 19 October merge to that release, and further cases where attacker agents exploit open-source flaws whose fixes exist only in the repository. *(opened 2026-11-21)*